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ABSTRACT 
 
Mobile money has the potential to be an effective policy 
instrument for financial inclusion in developing countries, 
but it also has the potential to fuel money laundering and 
terrorist financing. The 2012 revised Financial Action Task 
Force standards attempt to strike a workable balance 
between the goals of financial inclusion and financial 
integrity in developing countries. Mobile money schemes 
are mostly based in national markets, however, and are not 
normally designed to address the need of poor migrants for 
cheap, effective cross-border remittance services. Demand 
for such cross-border remittance services may drive the 
development of technical standards to build global markets 
from national ones. As in other global governance contexts, 
regulatory competition among both developed and 
developing countries is likely to arise, and be shaped by 
network externalities, the economics of platform markets, 
and new governance institutions as well as national 
government strategies. If such standard-setting efforts treat 
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compliance with AML/CTF as requirements, then the 
growth of global networks might promote both inclusion 
and the development of “integrity by design” in global 
mobile money technologies. Co-regulatory mechanisms 
already in place in the United States and European Union 
for managing the interface between technical standards 
and legislation might provide some helpful models for 
accomplishing this. Ensuring that the governance of global 
mobile money networks is effective, legitimate, and 
accountable from the perspective of stakeholders in both 
developed and developing economies will be difficult, 
however. 
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“This notion of standards, as boring as it is, is really the 
plumbing of the Internet economy,” Thibeau said. “It turns out that 
you can only go so far . . . until you come up with standards. 
Standards build markets. Standards help the pie grow bigger.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalization integrates what once appeared to be separate 
national markets, creating new challenges and opportunities in its 
1 Mark Milian, Will a Standardized System for Verifying Web Identity Ever 
Catch on?, CNN (Feb. 15, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/15/tech/web/ 
government-online-id/index.html (quoting Don Thibeau, the executive chairman 
for the OpenID Foundation).  
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wake. Opportunities spawned by globalization are not exclusively 
for the wealthy and educated in developed countries: the volume of 
migration by the world’s poor seeking a better life has also grown 
enormously in recent decades.2 Even when the poorest economic 
migrants enjoy modest success, however, they face another 
challenge: finding safe, inexpensive ways to send relatively small 
amounts of money back home. If they have migrated within a 
country that has a robust domestic remittance system, then this 
challenge is easily overcome. But most poor migrants live in 
countries that have made little progress in financial inclusion, or 
have migrated abroad and so must find a cross-border remittance 
mechanism.3 
This Article was written for a conference examining the impact 
of financial inclusion and financial integrity strategies on the 
growth of mobile money services in developing countries.4 In this 
Article, “mobile money” refers to mobile financial services 
generally, including mobile payments and mobile banking.5 As a 
2 “There are far more international migrants in the world today than ever 
previously recorded, and their number has increased rapidly in the last few 
decades…[in 2000, there were an estimated 150 million migrants; in 2010, there 
were an estimated 214 million].” INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, WORLD 
MIGRATION REPORT 2010, THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION: BUILDING CAPACITIES 
FOR CHANGE 3 (2010).  
3 Jake Kendall, The Poor Need Better Payment Services, CONSULTATIVE 
GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR (CGAP) (Dec.7, 2011), http://www.cgap.org/ 
blog/poor-need-better-payment-services. 
4 The proceedings of the conference were published in January 2013 as 
special issue of the WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS, 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wjtla. 
5 There is no generally accepted definition of “mobile money,” but the 
definition used in this Article has been used in other contexts. See generally 
Janine Firpo, E-Money–Mobile Money–Mobile Banking–What’s the Difference?, 
BLOGS.WORLDBANK.ORG (Jan. 21, 2009), http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/e-
money-mobile-money-mobile-banking-what-s-the-difference; PIERRE-LAURENT 
CHATAIN, ANDREW ZERZAN, WAMEEK NOOR, NAJAH DANNAOUI & LOUIS DE 
KOKER, PROTECTING MOBILE MONEY AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIMES xxvii (2011) 
(mobile money “refers to a financial service in which customers send and 
receive monetary value via a mobile phone. This includes retail payments and 
remittances from one person to another or between businesses. Salary and 
benefit distributions into mobile-linked accounts are also encountered in some 
countries. M-money accounts can be provided by many types of institutions, 
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result of the success of mobile payment schemes in countries such 
as Kenya6 and the Philippines, mobile money has emerged as a 
game-changing strategy for financial inclusion in developing 
countries.7 For the purposes of this Article, financial inclusion is 
defined as “. . . a state in which all people of working age have 
access to a full suite of quality financial services that includes 
payment services, savings, credit, and insurance. These services 
are provided at affordable prices, in a convenient manner, and with 
dignity for the clients.”8 In 2009, the World Bank estimated that 
the unbanked population of the world was 2.7 billion, or 70 percent 
of the adult population in the developing world. 9  Financial 
inclusion has been shown to increase economic growth, reduce 
income inequality and help alleviate poverty for this population.10  
In this Article, “financial integrity” refers to controls over 
financial services that support anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorist financing as well as conventional control objectives 
including disclosure to investors and management decision-
making. Although compliance with international anti-money 
including banks and nonbanks, such as mobile network operators and payment 
system providers. The category of services includes transaction-enabling 
services, such as domestic or international person-to-person funds transfers or 
mobile-based payment services. M-money services are part of the retail payment 
industry and are covered by the national payment system oversight policy.”). 
6 Mercy W. Buku & Michael W. Meredith, Safaricom and M-PESA in 
Kenya: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, 8 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 
375 (2013). 
7 George B. Radics, Development and Mobile-Banking in the Philippines 
(2011) (unpublished draft) (on file with author). 
8 CTR. FOR FIN. INCLUSION AT ACCION INT’L, MEXICO’S PROSPECTS FOR 
FULL FINANCIAL INCLUSION: A WHITE PAPER FROM THE FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
2020 PROJECT 4 (2009), available at http://centerforfinancialinclusionblog.files 
.wordpress.com/2011/10/mexicos-prospects-for-full-financial-inclusion-
english.pdf. 
9 JAKE KENDALL, NATALIYA MYLENKO & ALEJANDRO PONCE, MEASURING 
FINANCIAL ACCESS AROUND THE WORLD 25 (CGAP Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 5253, 2010), available at http://www.cgap.org/ 
sites/default/files/CGAP-Measuring-Financial-Access-around-the-World-Mar-
2010.pdf. 
10 WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR ALL? POLICIES AND PITFALLS IN EXPANDING 
ACCESS 28 (2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTFINFORALL/Resources/4099583-1194373512632/FFA_book.pdf. 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL MOBILE MONEY NETWORKS 201 
 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) guidelines 
has been seen as a barrier to the use of mobile money for financial 
inclusion in other developing countries, the 2012 revisions to 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) AML/CTF guidelines reflect 
efforts to address these concerns. 11  In developing countries, 
AML/CTF policies may sometimes appear to be dictated by 
external stakeholders, while safety and soundness concerns 
including the management of operational risks may appear to be 
more within the purview of national regulators.12 This Article will 
focus on those areas of financial market regulation conducted by 
national regulatory authorities where the two different strategies 
overlap, while conceding that there may be significant areas where 
they do not overlap or may even be at odds with each other.13 
To date, most efforts to promote the development of mobile 
money as a financial inclusion strategy have centered on national 
markets. As adoption rates grow for mobile money within national 
markets in developing countries, increased attention will turn to the 
possible use of mobile money for cross-border remittances. 14  
11 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: 
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS (2012) [hereinafter 2012 FATF 
RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/ 
documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%20(approved
%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May%202012%20web%20version.pdf. 
12 Rainer Hülsse, Even Clubs Can’t Do Without Legitimacy: Why the Anti-
Money Laundering Blacklist Was Suspended, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 459 
(2008); Claire Alexandre, Ignacio Mas & Daniel Radcliffe, Regulating New 
Banking Models to Bring Financial Services to All, 54 CHALLENGE 116 (2011). 
13 Exploring possible conflicts between FATF Guidelines and national 
financial services regulatory objectives is beyond the scope of this Article. On 
potential conflicts between transnational anti-money laundering efforts and 
national regulatory objectives, see generally Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War 
Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money 
Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 503 (2011); 
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State 
Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 15 
(2004). 
14 DALBERG GLOBAL DEV. ADVISORS, CGAP LANDSCAPE STUDY ON 
INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES THROUGH MOBILE MONEY (2012), available at 
http://www.gsma.com/developmentfund/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/ 
2012landscapestudyoninternationalremittancesthroughmobilemoney.pdf. 
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Demand for such cross-border remittance services will fuel 
demand for the development of a global mobile money network 
architecture based on a wide range of different types of 
“standards.” 15  In English, the word “standard” can refer to a 
bewildering array of different things, however. 16  In U.S. legal 
academic writing, a “standard” may refer to regulatory guidance or 
an open-ended principle contained in judicial precedent as opposed 
to a formal legal rule. 17 In social science or policy analysis, it 
might be a reference to “normative standards and advisory 
guidance” issued by “private regulators.” 18  In engineering, 
“standard” may refer to measurement standards, product and 
process standards, management standards, or interoperability 
standards. 19  In this Article, the term “technical standard” will 
generally be used to refer to engineering standards, while the term 
15 Glenbrook Partners, Visa, GSMA to Partner for Secure Mobile Money 
Services Globally, PAYMENTS NEWS (Feb. 18, 2009), 
http://www.paymentsnews.com/2009/02/visa-gsma-to-partner-for-secure-
mobile-financial-services-globally.html; NEIL DALY, GSMA INTERNATIONAL 
REMITTANCE SERVICE PROVIDERS : AN OVERVIEW OF MOBILE INTERNATIONAL 
REMITTANCE SERVICE PROVIDER SERVICE OFFERINGS (2010), available at 
http://www.gsma.com/developmentfund/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/ 
gsmaremittanceserviceproviderwhitepaper182.pdf; Jennifer Schenker, Mobile 
Money: Can Visa and Its Partners Help the Operators Stay in the Game? 
INFORMILO (Feb. 26, 2012), http://www.informilo.com/20120226/mobile-
money-can-visa-and-its-partners-help-operators-stay-game-536. 
16 For example, the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY online version 
recognized 28 separate meanings for “standard” as a noun (rather than an 
adjective or verb), with numerous sub-classifications within each of those 28 
meanings. Standard Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/188962?rskey=w0q1fc&result=1#eid (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2012). 
17 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
18 CGAP, GLOBAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
FOR THE POOR: TOWARD PROPORTIONATE STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE 1 (2011) 
(discussing “normative standards and advisory guidance”); TIM BÜTHE & 
WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 126-161 (2011) (discussing “private 
regulators”). 
19 CRAIG N. MURPHY & JOANNE YATES, THE INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO): GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH 
VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS (2009). 
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“standard” without qualification will generally refer to legal and 
political norms. 
The architecture of global markets is increasingly defined by 
information and communication technology (ICT) interoperability 
standards. This is because in recent decades, business 
administration has migrated from traditional bureaucracies and 
paper communications to network organizations linked by 
computers. The rise of ICT networks as the backbone of economic 
organization together with decades of trade liberalization are major 
factors contributing to the rise of global markets from what were 
once geographically remote local markets. Technical 
interoperability can be achieved in a wide variety of ways, 
including proprietary technologies that operate as de facto 
standards such as the Microsoft Windows operating system. 
Technical interoperability can also be achieved through open, 
collaborative processes such as open source software development 
or public standard-setting processes such as those conducted under 
the auspices of the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) or the Internet Engineering Task Force. Governance of 
technical standard-setting processes and managing the “interface” 
between national laws and technical standards are fundamental 
tasks that must be accomplished in order for any global market to 
function at an operational level.20 Interface here is used a metaphor 
for a “regulatory tool” or “mechanism choice.” 21  When ICT 
networks operate in both developing and developed countries 
simultaneously, these governance and management challenges 
become even more complex and difficult.22 
Different national governments respond to the challenges of 
20 See generally Jane K. Winn, Globalization and Standards: The Logic of 
Two-Level Games, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 185 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415424. 
21 See generally Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and Tools of 
Public Action: An Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO 
THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); Jonathan B. Weiner & 
Barak D. Richman, Mechanism Choice, in DANIEL A. FARBER & ANNE JOSEPH 
O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 363 
(2010). 
22 See, e.g., Howard Williams, Internet Governance: Exploring the 
Development Link, 58 COMM. & STRATEGIES 81 (2005); CGAP, supra note 18.  
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globalization in different ways because they take their institutional 
endowments and local political and economic culture into account 
when designing strategies. In the “varieties of capitalism” 
approach developed by Hall and Soskice, some countries can be 
identified as “liberal market economies” (LMEs) and others 
identified as “coordinated market economies” (CMEs).23 The most 
noteworthy LMEs include the United States, the United Kingdom., 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, while Germany, France and 
Japan are noteworthy examples of CMEs. In the context of mobile 
money as a financial inclusion and financial integrity strategy, the 
general LME/CME distinction might also be applied to the 
political economy of developing countries: Kenya seems to be a 
“developing country LME” while India seems to be a “developing 
country CME.” As a global network architecture for mobile money 
begins to emerge, distinct regulatory competition strategies may 
also emerge for developed LME, developed CME, developing 
LME and developing CME countries. As in all global markets 
defined by ICT networks, however, national regulatory 
competition strategies may be affected by economic variables such 
as strong network effects or the emergence of platform markets.24 
The 2012 FATF Guidelines strengthened the “Risk-Based 
Approach” to AML/CTF compliance efforts by making it 
mandatory rather than optional. 25  Regulators in developing 
countries will need more sophisticated tools than most now possess 
to demonstrate their compliance with this expanded Risk-Based 
Approach mandate. One common benefit of technical standards is 
reducing barriers to the diffusion of innovations. Although 
attention in mobile money standard-setting efforts is currently 
focused primarily on reducing barriers to its adoption, 
standardization efforts could also be focused on reducing the cost 
23 Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of 
Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
24 See infra Section III, Standards, Networks, and Platforms for further 
discussion of network effects and platform markets. 
25 2012 FATF GUIDELINES, supra note 11 at Recommendation 1; see 
generally Louis de Koker, The 2012 Revised FATF Recommendations: 
Assessing and Mitigating Mobile Money Integrity Risks Within the New 
Standards Framework, 8 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 165 (2013). 
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of demonstrating compliance with guidelines. With regard to 
computer security generally, it is now proverbial that “[s]ecurity is 
best baked in to the network, not bolted on later.”26 With regard to 
information privacy, an analogous concept is known as “Privacy 
by Design.”27 If technical standards for mobile money could be 
used to promote financial inclusion and reduce compliance costs 
simultaneously, such a result might be labeled “Integrity by 
Design.” Unless AML/CTF compliance issues are included in the 
scope of mobile money standard-setting activities, however, such a 
result is very unlikely, given the current security issues in the ICT 
networks of many developing countries.28 The flood of computer 
security and information privacy problems currently facing 
developed countries as a result of underinvestment in security in 
the past and the difficulty of retrofitting effective security and 
privacy functions onto existing systems suggests what the costs 
might be of postponing AML/CTF compliance considerations in 
the global mobile money context.29 
Ensuring that the governance of global mobile money networks 
is effective, legitimate, and accountable from the perspective of 
stakeholders in both developed and developing economies will be 
difficult. 30  The calculus of consensus building regarding 
26 Cisco, Cisco Systems Security—About, FACEBOOK (Oct 1, 2008), 
www.facebook.com/ciscosecurity/info; Henry Kenyon, DOD CIO Outlines 
Challenges: Handling Threats, New Tech with Shrinking Budgets, GOV’T 
COMPUTER NEWS (Oct. 24, 2011), http://gcn.com/articles/2011/10/24/dod-cio-
outlines-challenges-facing-military-networks.aspx.  
27 ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/privacybydesign.pdf; see generally Ira 
S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409 
(2011). 
28 See generally Andrew Harris, Seymour Goodman, & Patrick Traynor, 
Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money Applications in 
Africa, 8 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 245 (2013). 
29 See generally Jane K. Winn, Are “Better” Security Breach Notification 
Laws Possible?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1416222. 
30 See generally Anne Peters, Lucy Koechlin & Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, 
Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: Framing the Issue in an Interdisciplinary 
Fashion, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 1 (Anne Peters, Lucy 
Koechlin & Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel eds., 2009); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico 
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technology governance in the global information economy is 
complex and uncertain under the best of circumstances.31 If the 
shortest route to bringing technological innovations to market is 
adopted to achieve financial inclusion goals, the result may be the 
inadvertent creation of barriers to efficient compliance with 
AML/CTF mandates. But if technological innovation is required to 
take a back seat to the integration of compliance functions, then 
financial inclusion may suffer. If participation in governance is 
conditioned on technological sophistication and familiarity with 
global ICT standard-setting processes, then many developing 
country stakeholders will be disenfranchised. But if ICT technical 
standard-setting processes become too politicized, then the 
standards they produce may fail to achieve any market adoption at 
all. Some resolution of these issues will be necessary in order for a 
global mobile remittance network to succeed politically as well as 
economically. 
 
I. GLOBALIZATION, MIGRATION, AND REMITTANCES 
 
Although the term “globalization” only came into widespread 
use during the 1990s, the current wave of economic globalization 
is not the first.32 The first wave of globalization occurred between 
1870 and 1914, even though it was not given that label at the time. 
Although trade in goods increased, the hallmark of this first 
globalization was the mass migration of as much as 10 percent of 
the world’s population over this period. The scale of this migration 
has never been seen before or since. It was halted by the outbreak 
of World War I and law reforms during the interwar years intended 
to restrict immigration from the Old World in Europe and Asia to 
the New World of North and South America.  
Kirsch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005). 
31 The failure of the Open Systems Interconnection project illustrates well 
the fragility such projects. See generally Andrew L Russell, “Rough Consensus 
and Running Code” and the Internet-OSI Standards War, IEEE ANNALS HIST. 
COMPUTING, July-Sept. 2006, at 48.  
32 SUZANNE BERGER, HOW WE COMPETE: WHAT COMPANIES AROUND THE 
WORLD ARE DOING TO MAKE IT IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005). 
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The second wave of globalization occurred between 1950 and 
1973, and was ushered in by trade liberalization policies and 
technological innovations such as the containerization of shipping. 
This wave of globalization consisted largely of increased volume 
of trade in goods. Migration was modest in scope and involved as 
much migration of professionals out of developed countries to 
developing countries as workers from developing countries to 
developed ones. 
The third wave of globalization began in 1974 and continues 
through today.33 Migration is again accelerating, with hundreds of 
millions leaving developing countries in pursuit of economic 
opportunity, at the same time that trade in goods continues to 
increase. Although the absolute numbers of migrants may be 
unprecedented, the current rate of migration affects only a tiny 
percentage of world population. 
Economic migrants send home remittances, so the global 
market for remittances has grown together with migration. 
According to official estimates, the equivalent of US$440 billion in 
remittances was sent in 2010, although the actual volume of 
remittances is probably much higher. 34  Of this amount, 
approximately US$325 billion or roughly 75 percent was sent to 
developing countries. The total volume of remittance flows to 
many developing countries dwarfs direct foreign investment and 
foreign aid payments, and may equal 25 percent or more of GDP in 
some developing countries.35 
Economic migrants from developing countries often send 
relatively small amounts of money. Relative to the amount being 
transferred, remittance fees are often very high, averaging 10 
percent of the principal transmitted.36 As a result, many migrants 
rely on informal remittance systems. Informal remittance services 
33 Globalization: Three Waves of Change, THE ECONOMIST (July 17, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/11751235. 
34 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., MAXIMIZING THE DEVELOPMENT 
IMPACT OF REMITTANCES 25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2011/8 (2012), 
available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctncd2011d8_en.pdf. 
35 Id. 
36 Dilip Ratha, Remittances: Funds for the Folks Back Home, IMF FIN. & 
DEV. (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/ 
remitt.htm. 
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offer fertile ground for money laundering and terrorist financing. If 
migrants were provided access to inexpensive, efficient remittance 
services, this could promote increased financial inclusion and 
financial integrity at the same time. 
 
II. MOBILE MONEY: FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND FINANCIAL 
INTEGRITY 
 
“Financial deepening” has long been understood to play an 
important role in the development process: 
Economists have long contemplated the nature of 
complex links between financial development and 
economic growth . . . . Since the early 1990s, a 
growing body of [work by economists] has 
provided strong theoretical and empirical support 
for the hypothesis that financial development fosters 
economic growth.37 
In developing countries, widely disparate access to modern 
financial institutions and the persistence of traditional sources of 
finance, often create barriers to financial deepening and economic 
development:  
A developed financial system broadens access to 
funds; conversely, in an underdeveloped financial 
system, access to funds is limited and people are 
constrained by the availability of their own funds 
and have to resort to high cost informal sources 
such as money lenders. Lower the availability of 
funds and [increase] their cost, fewer would be the 
economic activities that can be financed and hence 
lower the resulting economic growth.38 
37 Nader Nazmi, Deregulation, Financial Deepening and Economic 
Growth: The Case of Latin America, 45 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 447, 447-48 
(2005). 
38 Dr. Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, 
Address at the 2006 Annual Bankers’ Conference, Economic Growth, Financial 
Deepening and Financial Inclusion (Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.bis.org/ 
review/r061121e.pdf. 
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The idea of finding ways to provide banking services to the poor in 
developing countries slowly began to gain momentum during the 
1990s.39 
In 1999, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
estimated that half of the six billion people that then constituted the 
world’s population had never even made or received a telephone 
call. 40  Around the same time that observation was offered, 
liberalization of telecommunications markets in the wake of the 
WTO telecom agreement was triggering a communications 
revolution in many developing countries.41 The entry of China into 
handset and telephone switching equipment markets also helped to 
fuel the growth of mobile communications in developing countries 
by reducing equipment prices. 42 Because telephones were not a 
major platform for the delivery of financial services in any country 
in the world during the 1990s, the connection between telephones 
and financial inclusion was not obvious to anyone at the time. 
During the 2000s, however, the sudden diffusion of mobile 
communications in developing countries emerged as the deus ex 
machina which unexpectedly made many financial inclusion 
problems look less intractable. As The Economist pointed out, “In 
places with bad roads, unreliable postal services, few trains and 
parlous landlines, mobile phones can substitute for travel, allow 
quicker and easier access to information on prices, enable traders  
 
 
39 JOHN CONROY, JAMIE BEDSON & NINA NAYAR, BANKING WITH THE POOR 
NETWORK: A HISTORY OF ASIA’S REGIONAL MICROFINANCE NETWORK 1990-
2010 (2001), available at http://www.fdc.org.au/data/ 
BWTP_Corporate_History.pdf. 
40 Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Opening Address at the ITU 
Telecom Opening Ceremony, ITU: Committed to Connecting the World, (Oct. 
9, 1999), quoted in Clay Shirky, Half the World, CLAY SHIRKY’S WRITINGS 
ABOUT THE INTERNET (June 30, 2002), http://shirky.com/writings/ 
herecomeseverybody/half_the_world_old.html. 
41 Peter Cowhey & Mikhail M. Klimenko, The WTO Agreement and 
Telecommunications Policy Reform (World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2601, 2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Cowhey_Klimenko1.pdf. 
42 See generally ERIC HARWIT, CHINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REVOLUTION (2008). 
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to reach wider markets, boost entrepreneurship and generally make 
it easier to do business.”43 
The success of some early mobile payments schemes in 
Kenya,44 South Africa45 and the Philippines46 helped to bring the 
issue of AML/CTF compliance for mobile payments into focus. 
The first international treaty to recognize the connection between 
national anti-money laundering efforts and the control of 
international crime was the 1988 United Nations Convention on 
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.47 
In 1989, the FATF was established at the initiative of what were 
then known as the G7 nations following the adoption by the United 
Nations General Assembly of a universal pledge to halt money 
laundering.48 Membership of the FATF started with 16 countries, 
and over the years gradually expanded to the current 36 members, 
including 34 countries and 2 regional organizations; international 
organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) are observers. 49  Regional FATF-style bodies are 
granted associate member status. In addition, nearly 150 other 
countries have committed to compliance with FATF guidance even 
though they are not members. In 1990, FATF issued a set of 40 
Recommendations, and these were supplemented by Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing that it adopted in 2001. 
The Recommendations were revised in 1996, 2003, and 2012. The 
43 Ted Eytan, A Special Report on Telecoms in Emerging Markets: Mobile 
Marvels, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/14483896. 
44 Buku & Meredith, supra note 6.  
45 Vivienne A. Lawack, Mobile Money, Financial Inclusion and Financial 
Integrity: The South African Case, 8 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 317 (2013). 
46 Radics, supra note 7.  
47 United Nations Convention on the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, art. 3-5, Dec. 20, 1988, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1582 U.N.T.S. 
95 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1990). 
48 NICOLAS RYDER, FINANCIAL CRIME IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LAW AND 
POLICY 16 (2011) (The G7 nations included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom, and United States).  
49 History of the FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); FATF 
Members and Observers, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
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FATF is not a formal international organization established by a 
treaty, but rather a very vigorous and surprisingly durable ad hoc 
task force, although it also has the support of the United Nations.50 
Members of the FATF have committed to implement the 
recommendations and agreed to be subject to multilateral 
surveillance, peer review and the publication of the International 
Cooperation Review Group list (formerly known as the Non-
cooperative Countries and Territories list). FATF works to ensure 
compliance with its Guidelines by requiring member countries to 
undertake an annual self-assessment, as well as mutual evaluations.  
In 2000 and 2001, FATF published lists identifying 23 “non-
cooperating countries and territories” that it found were not trying 
hard enough to fight against global money laundering. After a 
country was “blacklisted”, FATF worked with its regulators to help 
them bring their national regulatory systems into compliance with 
its guidelines. The blacklist’s regulatory bite came from the fact 
that FATF members in good standing were expected to take 
“counter-measures” to protect their economies from the risks of 
money laundering originating in blacklisted countries. 51  The 
counter-measures required financial institutions in member states 
to conduct enhanced customer due diligence before engaging in 
financial transactions with any individuals or entities in blacklisted 
countries. Given the expense of such enhanced due diligence, the 
practical result of being placed on FATF’s blacklist was that the 
volume of financial transactions into and out of a country could be 
sharply restricted. The FATF blacklist turned out to be more 
effective at getting the attention of “non-cooperating countries and 
territories” than its sponsors may have anticipated which in turn 
unleashed an intense backlash.52 When the World Bank and IMF 
50 S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005). 
51 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON NON-
COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES 8 (2000), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Initial%20Report%20on 
%20NCCTs%2002_2000.pdf; 2012 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, 
at Guideline 19. 
52 Todd Doyle, Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current 
FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 279, 
282 (2002) (“This development is disturbing and suggests a policy redolent of 
extraterritorial bullying.”). 
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joined the chorus of protests from developing countries about 
FATF’s lack of transparency and due process in its enforcement 
efforts, FATF backed off the blacklist strategy after only two 
years.53  
As financial inclusion became a more prominent issue in the 
development community, it did not take long for concerns to 
emerge about what impact stringent AML/CTF requirements might 
have on financial inclusion strategies in developing countries.54 As 
part of the move to Risk-Based Approach to compliance, FATF 
published reports on how its Risk-Based Approach could be 
applied to new payment methods including mobile money,55 and 
issued guidance on financial inclusion policies generally. 56  
Whether these efforts by FATF are enough to counteract the 
impression left from its use of the blacklist to coerce compliance, 
however, remains unclear. In 2011, the Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion produced for the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion a study of the impact of various global standard-setting 
organizations, such as FATF and the Basel Committee, on 
financial inclusion policies of five developing countries. 
All [five] country case studies identified the FATF 
as the [standard-setting body] with the most 
significant impact on regulatory innovation in 
relation to financial inclusion. The degree of impact 
53 Hülsse, supra note 12.  
54 JENNIFER ISERN, DAVID PORTEOUS, RAUL HERNANDEZ-COSS & 
CHINYERE EGWUAGU, AML/CTF REGULATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL 
SERVICE PROVIDERS THAT SERVE LOW-INCOME PEOPLE (2005), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-
1146581427871/AML_implications_complete.pdf.  
55 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS (2006), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Report 
%20on%20New%20Payment%20Methods.pdf; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 
MONEY LAUNDERING USING NEW PAYMENT METHODS (2010), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20using%20New 
%20Payment%20Methods.pdf. 
56  FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF GUIDANCE ON ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION (2011), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/ 
images/AML%20CFT%20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.pdf. 
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is mainly driven by concerns regarding the 
substantial penalties for non-compliance with the 
FATF Recommendations. The FATF framework is 
the only standards surveyed in this study with 
significant punitive measures for non-compliant 
jurisdictions, most notably the potential loss of 
correspondent banking relationships. These punitive 
measures may apply to members as well as non-
members. Such penalties may have far-reaching 
economic impacts on a non-compliant country if it 
results in economic and financial isolation. As a 
result, regulators are understandably hesitant to 
adopt measures that may expose their countries to 
reputational damage and the potential loss of 
corresponding bank relationships.57 
With time, recognition by FATF member countries that financial 
inclusion promotes the migration from the more opaque cash 
economy to the more transparent formal economy may help to 
ameliorate this legacy of mistrust and uncertainty in developing 
countries.58 The 2012 FATF Guidelines reflect the ongoing effort 
of FATF member countries to emphasize the complementarity of 
financial inclusion and financial integrity policies.59 
 
III. STANDARDS, NETWORKS, AND PLATFORMS 
 
In financial markets, ICT standards play an important role in 
increasing the “velocity” of assets by reducing transaction 
processing times; increasing transparency for lenders, borrowers, 
57 GLOBAL P’SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION, GLOBAL STANDARD SETTING 
BODIES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION: INSIGHTS AND LESSONS FROM FIVE 
COUNTRIES: BRAZIL, KENYA, MEXICO, THE PHILIPPINES, AND SOUTH AFRICA 9 
(2011), available at http://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Global%20Standard%20Setting%20Bodies%20and%20FI.pdf. 
58 Peter Dittus & Michael Klein, On Harnessing the Potential of Financial 
Inclusion 17 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 347, 2011), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work347.pdf. 
59 See generally Claire Alexandre & Lynn Chang Eisenhart, Mobile Money 
as an Engine of Financial Inclusion and Lynchpin of Financial Integrity, 8 
WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 285 (2013). 
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and regulators; reducing transaction costs; improving accuracy of 
data processing; and reducing compliance monitoring costs for 
both managers and regulators. 60 ICT standards are one type of 
technical standard. Technical standards are documents that 
establish engineering norms for products or processes. The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has defined 
standards as:  
[A] document, established by consensus and 
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for 
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at 
the achievement of the optimum degree of order in 
a given context[,] . . . based on the consolidated 
results of science, technology and experience, and 
aimed at the promotion of optimum community 
benefits.61  
Formal standards are developed by standard-developing 
organizations (SDOs) and are often a type of “public good.” Public 
goods are goods that are non-rivalrous (meaning that consumption 
by one person does not diminish the possibility of consumption by 
another) and non-excludable (meaning that it is not possible to 
prevent anyone from enjoying its use). Classic examples of public 
goods include ideas, national defense or broadcast television. 
Formal standards are often a particular type of public good known 
as a “club good” which is non-rivalrous but exclusive. Classic 
examples of club goods include telephone or cable television 
networks. Formal standards are normally copyrighted by the 
organization that produced them, and must be purchased by anyone 
wishing to use them, so they do not normally qualify as pure public 
60 Electronic Records and Signatures Association, Electronic Records and 
Signature Update, June 5, 2008; Brian Williamson and Philliipa Marks, 
Standardization in ICT : Current Economic Perspectives, in ICT SHAPING THE 
WORLD: A SCIENTIFIC VIEW 199-200 (Gérard Pogorel & Michel Riquidel eds., 
2009).  
61 Standards and Regulations—Definitions, ISO/IEC INFORMATION CENTRE 
(June 20, 2011), http://www.standardsinfo.net/info/standards_regulations.html 
(quoting INT’L STANDARDS ORG., ISO/IEC GUIDE 2:2004 STANDARDIZATION 
AND RELATED ACTIVITIES—GENERAL VOCABULARY (8th ed. 2004)).  
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goods. Formal or de jure standards may be contrasted with de facto 
standards which emerge from practice but which may lack any 
form of legal recognition. For example, the Microsoft Windows 
operating system is a de facto standard for personal computer 
software, but it is not a formal standard.62 De facto standards may 
function as both “private goods” (i.e., private property) and club 
goods simultaneously. 
From an economic perspective, public goods are often 
problematic because there are usually insufficient market 
incentives to produce them in the quantities required by the 
public.63 For example, a national highway system has many of the 
characteristics of a public good. A government may choose to 
make its national highway system non-excludable and pay for its 
construction with government revenues, or it may permit a private 
organization to build the highway and then exclude users who do 
not pay tolls to recapture the costs of its construction. In the 
absence of either government construction using tax revenues or a 
license to operate a highway as a toll road, however, a national 
highway system is unlikely to emerge because private parties 
would normally have no incentive to build it.  
Technical standards function as economic infrastructure that 
reduces barriers to the dissemination of technological innovation, 
and increases consumer welfare by ensuring technical 
interoperability among products made by different producers. As 
with other public goods, market forces alone may not produce the 
optimal level or design of technical standards because private 
parties may prefer to focus their attention on private goods for 
market production. The economic benefits of proprietary 
technologies may be concentrated on the owner of the technology 
while their costs are spread over a large group of users, but with 
standards, the benefits are spread over a large group of users while 
the costs are concentrated on a smaller group of producers. 
62 As a matter of national regulatory culture, regulators in LMEs such as the 
United States are more willing to treat de facto standards as equivalent to formal 
standards, while regulators in CMEs are more inclined to deny that they are 
standards at all. That debate is outside the scope of this Article. 
63 See generally TYLER COWEN, PUBLIC GOODS AND MARKET FAILURES: A 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION (1991). 
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Because they produce widespread benefits, the development and 
promotion of technical standards are normally pivotal elements of 
national industrial policy in developed market economies. 64 By 
contrast, treating proprietary technologies as de facto standards 
conflates the private nature of proprietary technologies and the 
public nature of “standards” as that term is defined by ISO.65  
The governance framework for technical standard setting may 
vary significantly between LMEs and CMEs, with LMEs favoring 
a “bottom up” private sector driven approach while CMEs favor a 
“top down” government orchestrated approach. Although issues 
related to the governance of technical standard-setting processes 
may be controversial, there is more of a consensus regarding the 
costs and benefits of using standards.66 The social and economic 
benefits of standardization include: 
 Reducing costs through the simplification of complex 
processes; 
 Reducing learning costs for new producers; 
 Allowing producers to exploit economies of scale; 
 Lowering transaction costs between transacting parties; 
 Promoting market information and confidence by signaling 
product quality, or the compatibility of products or 
components; 
 Reducing compliance costs; and 
 Increasing competition among producers, lowering prices 
to consumers. 
64 Jay Tate, National Varieties of Standardization, in VARIETIES OF 
CAPITALISM 442 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
65 Microsoft’s decision to convert its proprietary Word technology into a 
standard in order to block competition from products based on the Open 
Document Format standard was controversial for this reason. Jason Mick, 
Microsoft Wins Document Format Standards Battle, DAILY TECH (Apr. 2, 
2008), http://www.dailytech.com/Microsoft+Wins+Document+Format+ 
Standards+Battle/article11338.htm. 
66 See generally Michelle Egan, Setting Standards: Strategic Advantages in 
International Trade, 13 BUS. STRATEGY REV. 51 (2002). 
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However, the costs of standardization may also be substantial 
and include: 
 Reducing product variety; 
 Imposing costs of achieving compliance with standards and 
obtaining certification of compliance; 
 Imposing one-time switching costs for established products 
to comply with subsequent standards; and 
 Increasing switching costs away from obsolete or sub-
optimal standards. 
Formal public international standard-setting organizations that 
may have jurisdiction over ICT technical standards include the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU); each of these 
organizations has a formal, public counterpart in each country that 
chooses to participate in them. While the processes used by these 
global technical standard-setting organizations seek to be 
transparent and inclusive, they may also be slow, bureaucratic, and 
out of touch with conditions in the markets in which the standards 
are to be implemented.67 
Technological change in markets for ICT products may be very 
rapid, and because consumer demand for new ICT products often 
depends on their interoperability with other ICT products, there is 
also a need for rapid development of ICT standards. In order to 
ensure that ICT standard development can keep pace with rapid 
technological innovation in global ICT markets, new forms of 
private international standard-developing organizations known as 
“consortia” or “fora” have emerged in recent years.68 These new 
67 See generally Costas Andropoulos, Head of Unit, DG Enterprise and 
Industry, ICT for Competitiveness and Innovation, Presentation at European 
ICT Standardisation Policy at a Crossroads: A New Direction for Global 
Success (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/ 
cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=3604. 
68 See generally Jane K. Winn, US and EU Regulatory Competition and 
Authentication Standards in Electronic Commerce, in NEW APPLICATIONS IN IT 
STANDARDS 35 (Kai Jakobs ed., 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
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ICT SDOs range in size from a small handful of members working 
closely together to thousands of members scattered around the 
world collaborating by means of Internet communications. The 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), developer of the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) standard 
which defines the Internet, and the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) are examples of large, informal ICT standard-developing 
organizations with members around the world. By contrast, 
EMVCo, the ICT SDO for the European EMV payments standard, 
has only four members: American Express, JCB, MasterCard, and 
Visa. Informal private ICT SDOs are often referred to as consortia, 
and because they are generally exempt from regulation by national 
governments, they can often develop standards more quickly and 
efficiently than formal, public ICT SDOs.69 
Although consortia may not be formally recognized under 
international law as a source of technical standards,70 what they 
lack in formal legal status, they often make up for in market 
power.71 This will be true if consortia standards define networks 
abstract=901324; Carl Cargill, The Informal Versus the Formal Standards 
Development Process: Myth and Reality, in STANDARDIZATION ESSENTIALS: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 257 (Steven M. Spivak & F. Cecil Brenner eds., 
2001). 
69 GREG FITZPATRICK, THE FAILURE OF EUROPEAN ICT STANDARDS POLICY 
AND A POSSIBLE FUTURE (2003), available at http://www.itkommissionen.se/ 
doc/650.html. 
70 The status of standards issued by formal international SDOs such as ISO, 
IEC and ITU comes in part from the recognition that their adoption as national 
standards provides countries with a defense to claims brought under the WTO 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. See generally Scott Kennedy, The 
Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining China’s Involvement in 
High-Tech Standards Wars, 2 ASIA POL’Y 41 (2006). 
71 In principle, ISO does not work directly with consortia. It normally 
reissues national standards submitted by national standard setting bodies (e.g., 
ANSI, the British Standards Institute, Association Française de 
Normalisation (AFNOR), Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN), Japanese 
Standards Association, etc.) as international standards, or develops international 
standards. However, ISO does maintain two back doors—a “fast track” process 
and a “publicly available submission” process—that under certain circumstances 
permit consortia to submit standards directly to ISO for review without first 
getting them adopted by a national standards body. 
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characterized by strong “network effects.”72 Network effects are 
created when strong positive and negative externalities drive 
consumers to use only one network, which may give the network 
operator a dominant market position as well as de facto regulatory 
authority over network participants. 73  Markets operating within 
ICT networks may also be characterized as “multi-sided 
platforms.”74 The operator of a platform market may contribute to 
the success of the platform by setting prices to attract certain 
participants to it. Such a strategy consists of imposing high prices 
on those who have the most interest in the success of the platform, 
and low prices to those who have the least interest. Classic 
examples of such pricing strategies include the use of advertising 
revenues to subsidize the purchase of newspapers by consumers, or 
selling a video game console at cost, and then setting the price to 
end users of computer games high enough to subsidize the 
development of new games. 
If a global platform for mobile remittances emerges, and its 
operators enjoy significant market power based on strong network 
effects, then national regulators could find themselves under 
pressure from their own citizens clambering to enjoy its positive 
network effects to give such a platform local market access. If a 
global network operator has enough market power, it may be able 
to resist pressure to bear the cost of “localizing” its services to 
comply with regulations in each national market it enters. Under 
such circumstances, national regulators may be forced to choose 
between granting citizens access to a global network and 
exercising their authority in their national markets. This issue has 
already emerged in global electronic payment services with regard 
to the authority of global card payment services companies such as 
Visa and MasterCard to control the terms and conditions under 
72 See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 
(1999). 
73 Jane K. Winn, Technical Standards as Data Protection Regulation, in 
REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 191 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118542. 
74 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided 
Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003); DAVID S. EVANS, ANDREI HAGIU & 
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, INVISIBLE ENGINES: HOW SOFTWARE PLATFORMS 
DRIVE INNOVATION AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES (2006). 
 
                                                                                                             
220 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:3 
 
which their services are supplied in different countries around the 
world.75 
 
IV. GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY COMPETITION 
 
Regulatory competition refers to competition among different 
sovereigns for mobile economic resources such as labor and capital 
by offering different regulatory regimes to attract them.76 “Race to 
the bottom” regulatory competition strategies generally involve 
regulatory regimes that externalize the costs of attracting mobile 
economic resources onto someone other than the owner of the 
resource either inside or outside of a sovereign’s territory. For 
example, using weak labor and environmental protection laws to 
attract foreign investment may externalize some production costs 
onto workers and citizens affected by pollution within that country 
while allowing foreign investors to enjoy increased profits as a 
result of lower nominal production costs. “Race to the top” or the 
“California effect” is the opposite strategy: a sovereign with 
market power can require producers to internalize more production 
costs than other sovereigns do. California used this strategy 
successfully when it required the use of catalytic converters on all 
cars sold in California. When other sovereigns followed 
California’s example, then producers that had adapted to the 
stricter California standard had a competitive advantage over 
producers that had not yet done so. The analysis of regulatory 
competition becomes even more complex when national 
governments are competing with non-state and hybrid regulators  
 
75 China recently suffered a setback in its national strategy of limiting Visa 
and MasterCard’s access to domestic Chinese markets for electronic payment 
services by promoting a domestic competitor known as UnionPay. Panel Report, 
China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R 
(July 16, 2012). The Indian government may have more luck with its effort 
known as RuPay to disintermediate Visa and MasterCard in the Indian domestic 
payment market. Rupay Card Launched in India, RUPAY CARD (Sept. 30, 2011, 
7:24 AM), http://www.rupaycard.info/2011/09/rupay-card-launched-in-
india.html. 
76 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956). 
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whose scope of authority is ambiguous and whose regulatory tools 
are different.77 
With regard to a global network for mobile remittances, 
regulatory competition could arise among both developed and 
developing countries to shape the governance framework for 
mobile money networks. In addition to network externalities and 
the economics of platform markets, regulatory competition in 
global markets is shaped by the interaction of nation states with 
new private global governance institutions by a new trend: 
[T]he delegation of regulatory authority from 
governments to a single international private-sector 
body that, for its area of expertise, is viewed by 
both public and private actors as the obvious forum 
for global regulation. In that particular issue area, 
such a private body is what [Büthe and Mattli] refer 
to as the focal institution for global rulemaking. 
This simultaneous privatization and 
internationalization of governance is driven, in part, 
by governments’ lack of requisite technical 
expertise, financial resources, or flexibility to deal 
expeditiously with ever more complex and urgent 
regulatory tasks.78 
The FATF is clearly a “focal institution of global rule-making” for 
financial integrity, while the Society for World-Wide Interbank 
Telecommunications (SWIFT) is a focal institution for global 
remittances executed by banks. It is unclear now what institution, 
if any, will emerge as the focal institution for the emerging global 
mobile remittance network.  
In the information technology field, the question of what kind 
of “focal institution of global rule-making” should govern the 
Internet remains a matter of considerable and persistent 
international controversy. The current focal institutions for the 
77 Burkard Eberlein, Kenneth W. Abbott, Julia Black, Errol Meidinger & 
Stepan Wood, Transnational Business Governance Interactions: 
Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 
(forthcoming 2013).  
78 BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 18, at 5.  
 
                                                                                                             
222 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:3 
 
Internet include the IETF and W3C, which are informal 
collaborative networks of individuals and organizations, and the 
Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a 
California non-profit corporation backed by the U.S. government. 
While many citizens and governments in LMEs support the 
management of the Internet by IETF, W3C and ICANN precisely 
because they are private, many citizens and governments in many 
CMEs (as well as authoritarian societies) believe strongly that the 
ITU as a formal, public and international SDO should govern the 
Internet instead.79  
In specific ICT markets, either conventional SDOs or consortia 
may play the role of focal institutions. The Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is a conventional SDO, the 
modern successor to electrical industry SDOs going back to the 
nineteenth century. The IEEE is accredited by the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), which means that it complies 
with the due process requirements contained in ANSI Essential 
Requirements.80 The IEEE developed the IEEE 802 family of local 
area network standards for wireless communications that includes 
technologies marketed to the public as Wi-Fi. After the IEEE 
802.11 standard was developed, however, promotion of the Wi-Fi 
concept was turned over to the Wi-Fi Alliance, a consortium which 
is not ANSI accredited. The Wi-Fi Alliance manages the use of the 
Wi-Fi trademark and logo, and certifies that products are compliant 
with the standard, in addition to developing new standards in 
response to changing market conditions. The Wi-Fi Alliance has 
two classes of voting members: a small group of “sponsor 
members” with more authority over decision making, and “regular 
members.” It also has affiliate members with limited voting rights 
79 Geoff Houston, ICANN, the ITU, WSIS, and Internet Governance, 8 
INTERNET PROTOCOL J., Mar. 2005, at 15-28, available at 
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_8-
1/internet_governance.html. 
80 AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE 
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS (2012), 
available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards% 
20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20a
nd%20Forms/2012%20ANSI%20Essential%20Requirements%20and%20other
%20Updated%20Procedures/2012_ANSI_Essential_Requirements.pdf. 
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and adopter members without voting rights. 81  The Bluetooth 
Special Interest Group (SIG) develops standards for short-range, 
low-cost wireless communication technology for use with mobile 
devices and also promotes the adoption of the technology. Even 
though the Bluetooth SIG generally maintains open, transparent 
processes, it also maintains different classes of membership, and 
restricts admission: individuals are not allowed to join at all, and 
control over the most important management decisions is retained 
by seven “promoter” companies (Ericsson, Intel, Lenovo, 
Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, and Toshiba). 82  GS1 is the most 
important international radio frequency identification (RFID) 
SDO, and is considered to be a consortium.83 It is the successor to 
the Uniform Code Council and EAN International, the 
organizations that promoted the use of barcode technology since 
the 1970s. It has affiliated organizations in over 100 countries, and 
participation in GS1 activities is managed through the local 
affiliates. The GSM Association (GSMA), the main SDO and 
industry association for mobile telephone services around the 
world, is also a consortium.84 Full membership in the GSMA is 
limited to wireless network operators, and other businesses in one  
 
 
81 Bylaws of the Wi-Fi Alliance, WI-FI ALLIANCE (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.wi-fi.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/WFA_Bylaws_ 
20120106.pdf. 
82 SIG Membership Introduction, BLUETOOTH SIG MEMBER SITE, 
http://www.bluetooth.org/apps/content/?doc_id=44513 (last visited Dec. 15, 
2012). 
83 ICT Standards Consortia, EUR. COMM. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
http://www.cen.eu/cen/sectors/sectors/isss/consortia/pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2013). In 2003, GS1 formed EPCglobal, a global membership 
organization that works to promote the adoption of “electronic product codes” 
and RFID technology. EPCglobal develops standards, provides conformity 
certification for products, accredits other organizations to provide conformity 
testing, and provides training, marketing and political advocacy for RFID 
products and services. Electronic Product Code (EPC): An Overview, GS1 (Jan. 
2007), http://www.gs1.org/docs/epcglobal/an_overview_of_EPC.pdf. 
84 Standard Setting Organizations and Standards List: Telecom, 
CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG, http://www.consortiuminfo.org/links/linkscats.php?ID 
=26 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
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of four categories are eligible to join as associate members, but 
individuals cannot join.85 
The whole idea of an ICT standards consortium originated in 
the United States, so it is not surprising that the official U.S. 
Standard Strategy treats the work of ICT consortia as equivalent to 
the work of formal SDOs.86 This openness to treating consortia 
and formal public SDOs as equivalent is generally limited to 
LMEs, however. Until very recently, European regulators have 
been hostile to the idea of recognizing standards developed by 
consortia in legislation or public procurement, preferring instead to 
rely on international standards issued by formal public SDOs such 
as ISO or ITU, or standards developed by formal European 
SDOs. 87  European regulators have justified their reluctance to 
embrace consortia standards by noting the success of the European 
CME approach to ICT standardization in the case of GSM 
technology.88 Since the success of GSM, however, there have not 
been many major successes for the European CME model of ICT 
standardization in global markets, making it more difficult for EU 
regulators to avoid working with consortia standards. In 2011, the 
Commission announced its intention to permit reference to 
consortia standards in EU regulations and public procurement, 
provided that the processes by which those standards were 
85 Types of Membership, GSMA, http://www.gsma.com/membership/types-
of-membership/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
86 AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., UNITED STATES STANDARD STRATEGY 3 
(3d ed. 2010), available at http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/nss/ 
usss.aspx (“Global standardization goals are achieved in the United States 
through sector-specific activities and through alliances and processes provided 
by companies, associations, standards developing organizations, consortia, and 
collaborative projects.”). 
87 European formal SDOs are very similar in structure to international 
formal SDOs: the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), which 
corresponds to ISO, the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization (CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI) which correspond to the ITU; cooperation between CEN and 
ISO is governed by the Vienna Agreement and cooperation between CENELEC 
and IEC is governed by the Dresden agreement. See generally Winn, supra note 
20.  
88 Jacques Pelkmans, The GSM Standard: Explaining a Success Story, 8 J. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 432 (2001). 
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developed meet European due process standards: 
The selected ICT standards will complement 
European standards and must comply with quality 
criteria. Those criteria, which address both the 
standards developing processes and the standards 
themselves, cover matters such as openness, 
transparency and neutrality as well as imposing the 
same minimum requirements as applied by the 
ESOs for the treatment of intellectual property (IP) 
rights.89  
The EU quality criteria for consortia due process come from the 
Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and 
Application of Standards, Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade.90  
The European Union is clearly engaged in a “race to the top” 
regulatory competition strategy with regard to recognition of 
consortia ICT standards. While critics of its standards strategy 
might view the United States as engaged in a “race to the bottom” 
by permitting ICT consortia to pursue market opportunities 
unencumbered by social regulations, supporters of the U.S. 
approach would characterize it as “bottom up” (i.e., populist rather 
than “top down” or bureaucratic) and market-driven.91 European 
regulators are calculating they can use access to the European 
Internal Market for leverage in their regulatory competition with 
the United States to influence the character of the global 
information economy. If this strategy is not successful, then the 
89 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: A Strategic Vision 
for European Standards: Moving Forward to Enhance and Accelerate the 
Sustainable Growth of the European Economy by 2020, at 16, COM (2011) 311 
final (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0311:FIN:EN:PDF.  
90 Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recommendations 
adopted by the Committee Since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev.8 (May 23, 
2000), available at http://www.astm.org/GLOBAL/images/wto.pdf (including 
decisions of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International 
Standards, Guides, and Recommendations). 
91 See generally Winn, supra note 73.  
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architecture of the global information economy will continue to be 
dominated by U.S. standards policy. 
If the emerging global mobile remittance architecture becomes 
a platform market as well as a network supported by strong 
network effects, then regulators in developed and developing 
CMEs may find it difficult to exercise regulatory authority over its 
operation within their borders. This is because the private operator 
of a successful ICT-based platform has considerable discretion 
with regard to the terms and conditions of access to the platform 
market, and the prices of services offered through the platform.92 
Once a platform based on global ICT networks takes root within a 
domestic economy, regulators may find it difficult (although not 
impossible) to mandate changes in the way the platform operates.93 
A market-driven globally interoperable mobile remittance 
network is already emerging. Visa and GSMA are partnering with 
financial institutions, mobile network operators, handset 
manufacturers, technology service providers, and industry 
associations around the world to build that global architecture.94 
Because this effort is being spearheaded by the private company 
that administers the largest proprietary payment card network in 
the world,95 and a private ICT consortium, its roots are clearly in 
the LME environment. This is not the only source of standards for 
mobile remittances, however. For example, the Government of 
India is actively promoting the development of a domestic Indian 
mobile payments architecture based on open standards. 96 If the 
92 See generally EVANS ET AL., supra note 74.  
93 DAVID S. EVANS, INTERCHANGE FEES: THE ECONOMICS AND 
REGULATION OF WHAT MERCHANTS PAY FOR CARDS vi (2011), available at 
http://origin.library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1102767390831-
1382/Interchange-Fees-web-2.pdf (noting that the United States, European 
Union, and Australia have all taken action in recent years to force credit card 
networks to change their pricing policies).  
94 Bruce Burke, Towards a Global, Interoperable Mobile Money Network, 
MOBILEPAYMENTSTODAY.COM (July 22, 2011), http://www.mobilepayments 
today.com/blog/6013/Towards-a-global-interoperable-mobile-money-network.  
95 Panel Report, supra note 75, at § 7.39 (“[I]t is the [Electronic Payment 
Service] provider’s intellectual property that enables the switching of the 
transaction and supports the electronic payment process, the transaction is 
governed by the EPS provider’s rules and procedures . . . .”).  
96 Indian Banks Collaborate on Merchant Payments Platform, GTNEWS 
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Indian CME approach to standardizing mobile payments is 
successful within the Indian domestic market, it might appeal to 
regulators in other developing countries.97 
 
V. INTEGRITY BY DESIGN 
 
For national regulators in developing countries who are 
working to promote financial inclusion, significant challenges arise 
in two broad areas of AML/CTF compliance: establishing identity 
under agreed “know your customer” (KYC) or “customer due 
diligence” (CDD) rules; and “suspicious transaction reporting” 
under agreed protocols to detect suspect patterns of financial 
transfers.98 For developing countries such as China and Kenya that 
had strong national identity systems in place long before 
AML/CTF norms were even invented, it might be possible to use 
ICT standards to rationalize KYC processes and make them more 
efficient. For countries such as India that have never had a strong 
national identity system, the Risk-Based Assessment approach in 
the 2012 FATF Guidelines now permits national regulators and 
mobile payment service providers to develop alternative KYC 
protocols for which ICT standards may have little relevance.99 
(Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.gtnews.com/News/2012/Indian_Banks_Collaborate 
_on_Merchant_Payments_Platform.html. 
97 RADHA SOMAKUMAR & THOMAS MATHEW, MOBILE MONEY, FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION, & FINANCIAL INTEGRITY CASE STUDY: INDIA (2012), available at 
https://files.law.washington.edu/other/MobileMoney/. 
98 Dittus & Klein, supra note 58.  
99 For example, Reserve Bank of India KYC regulations permit someone 
without any other identity documents to use a letter from a recognized public 
authority or public servant verifying the identity and residence of the customer 
in order to open a bank account. Master Circular – 'Know Your Customer' 
(KYC) Guidelines – Anti Money Laundering Standards, RESERVE BANK OF 
INDIA (July 1, 2009), http://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_CircularIndexDisplay.aspx 
?Id=5083. India is currently building a national digital identity system. See 
generally Planning Comm’n, Unique Identification Authority of India, UIDAI, 
http://uidai.gov.in/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); see also Louis de Koker, Will 
RICA’s Customer Identification Data Meet Anti-Money Laundering 
Requirements and Facilitate the Development of Transformational Mobile 
Banking in South Africa?: An Exploratory Note, CTR. FOR FIN. REGULATION & 
INCLUSION (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.cenfri.org/documents/ 
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Because national endowments with regard to identifying 
citizens vary so widely across developing countries, ICT standards 
may be more useful in lowering AML/CTF compliance costs if 
they focus on “suspicious activity reporting.” Financial institutions 
in developed countries already use sophisticated analytics on large 
databases of transactional information to detect patterns of 
behavior that might indicate money laundering.100  
Historically, advanced analytics have been used, 
among other things, to analyze large data sets in 
order to find patterns that can help isolate key 
variables to build predictive models for decision-
making. Companies use advanced analytics with 
data mining to optimize their customer 
relationships; law enforcement agencies use 
advanced analytics to combat criminal activity from 
terrorism to tax evasion to identify theft. Naturally, 
these methods have their limits; for example, data 
mining in search of new patterns in counter-
terrorism may yield little value.101  
If data formats and analytics for suspicious activity reporting 
related to mobile payments could be standardized, that might 
reduce barriers to the use of those same technologies in developing 
countries. Just as falling prices of telephone switching equipment 
and handsets helped spark the mobile telephony revolution in 
developing countries, falling prices for servers, processors, open 
source database software designed to work with very large 
databases, high bandwidth networks, cloud computing and other 
flexible resource allocation arrangements might make it possible 
Financial%20inclusion/2010/RICA%20impact%20on%20financial%20inclusion
_final.pdf. 
100 John Beck & John Morton, How Banks Can Make the Most of Data, THE 
BANKER (June 1, 2012), http://www.thebanker.com/Tech-Trading/Technology/ 
How-banks-can-make-the-most-of-data?ct=true (“Today, most banks are using 
analytics very much on a departmental or a business unit basis, such as in their 
credit risk, market risk or anti-money laundering capabilities.”). 
101 Ann Cavoukian & Jeff Jonas, Privacy by Design in the Era of Big Data, 
PRIVACY BY DESIGN, 5 (June 8, 2012), http://privacybydesign.ca/content/ 
uploads/2012/06/pbd-big_data.pdf. 
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for managers and regulators in developing countries to enjoy at 
least some of the benefits of “Big Data.”102 Increasing the use of 
data analytics among mobile money service providers might be 
one strategy to help regulators and service providers in developing 
countries take full advantage of the flexibility offered with the 
Risk-Based Approach in the 2012 FATF Guidelines. However, 
because even sophisticated business enterprises in developed 
countries find it difficult to extract the full value of “Big Data,”103 
it is clear that regulators and service providers in developing 
countries would require not just ICT standards but also 
considerable technical assistance in order to deploy similar 
technologies effectively under more difficult circumstances. 
Current best practices in the development of information 
technology indicate that factors like privacy and security, or by 
analogy, financial integrity, should be treated as requirements from 
the beginning of the design process in order to be effective. Ann 
Cavoukian, Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, coined the 
term “Privacy by Design” to describe a rigorous, proactive 
approach to information privacy. 104 The concept includes early 
mitigation of privacy concerns when developing information 
technologies and systems, as well as continued focus on privacy 
concerns throughout the entire information life cycle. The notion 
of Privacy by Design was always consistent with EU data 
protection law principles, and has now been embraced by EU 
regulators as a key element of their approach to thinking about the 
design of information technology and privacy.105 The U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission has now incorporated the idea into its 
102 Dan Briody, Big Data: Harnessing a Game-Changing Asset, SAS (Sept. 
2011), http://www.sas.com/resources/asset/SAS_BigData_final.pdf. 
103 Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management 
Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2012, at 60 (to reap the rewards of big data 
analytics will require changes in leadership, talent management, technology, 
decision-making processes, and company culture). 
104 CAVOUKIAN, supra note 27.  
105 Viviane Reding, Vice-President, European Comm’n, Speech at the 
Round-table High Level Conference on Mobilising the Cloud, Privacy in the 
Cloud: Data Protection and Security in Cloud Computing (Dec. 7, 2011), 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-859_en.htm. 
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information privacy strategy as well.106 Alan Paller, of the SANS 
Institute, makes a similar point about computer security generally 
when he argues that security only works if it is “baked in,” rather 
than being “bolted on” after a product has been completed. 107  
Support for this “end-to-end” approach to privacy and security is 
growing among some leading information technology companies, 
and has been incorporated into their product development 
processes, although this change in attitude in the private sector is 
far from universal.108  
Recent attempts by the global payment card industry to 
upgrade security on its existing network provide a cautionary tale 
of how difficult and controversial the process of retrofitting 
privacy and security technologies can be. In 2004, the global credit 
card industry launched the Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCI DSS) as a joint industry effort to respond to 
pressure from regulators in countries with strong data protection 
laws about the security of personal information in their systems, 
and to reduce the costs associated with large data breaches 
involving the loss of consumer payment card information by retail 
merchants. The PCI DSS standards are intended to establish a 
mandatory minimum level of security for retail merchants 
processing consumer card data, and range from basic common 
sense (do not use vendor-supplied default passwords) and modern 
risk management best practices (maintain a written security policy 
and regularly test security), to very specific requirements (use a 
firewall, issue a unique ID to each person accessing the system). 
Early versions of the PCI DSS standard were widely criticized by 
retail merchants as expensive and ineffective, and for having been 
developed by the credit card networks and banks without adequate 
consultation with the retail merchants expected to implement 
them. 109  Even after the PCI DSS standard-setting process was 
106 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 
(2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/03/privacyframework.shtm. 
107 Alan Paller, Cisco Wins National Cybersecurity Innovation Award, 
SANS (Nov. 3, 2011), https://www.sans.org/press/cisco-wins-ncia.php. 
108 Rubinstein, supra note 27.  
109 Michael Garry, PCI Seeks Retailer Feedback, SUPERMARKET NEWS (July 
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opened up to greater participation by all stakeholders, and the 
investment of many years of effort in implementation, independent 
surveys suggest widespread non-compliance with PCI DSS 
standards persists even in developed countries.110 Litigation in the 
United States has even called the legality of the scheme into 
question: when an American bank exercised its right under the 
scheme to fine a merchant for its alleged failure to comply with the 
standard, the merchant filed suit against the bank, highlighting the 
lack of accountability and transparency in the administration of the 
PCI DSS standards, and the bank’s failure to prove that the 
security breach had originated with the merchant in the first 
place.111  
While embracing the notion of “Integrity by Design” for the 
development of a global mobile remittance architecture might 
reduce the risks associated with trying to “bolt on” financial 
integrity functions after the network is already operational, such an 
effort would also introduce new risks. Whenever the requirements 
for standards are expressed too broadly, or incorporate too many 
politically contested factors, then the odds that the resulting 
standards will be widely adopted usually decline unless adoption is 
mandated by a regulator. At present, there is no global regulator 
capable of mandating compliance with ICT technical standards for 
mobile remittances that incorporate financial integrity 
requirements. If the adoption of ICT technical standards for global 
6, 2009), http://supermarketnews.com/retail-amp-financial/pci-seeks-retailer-
feedback. 
110 Mathew J. Schwartz, 67% Of Companies Fail Credit Card Security 
Compliance, INFORMATIONWEEK (April 20, 201), 
http://www.informationweek.com/security/management/67-of-companies-fail-
credit-card-securit/229401946 (“PCI may have an image problem. According to 
the study, 50% of security professionals view PCI as a burden, and 59% don't 
think it helps them improve security. Furthermore, comparing this study with the 
inaugural one conducted in 2009, the number of respondents who said they had 
sufficient resources to comply with PCI dropped from 40% to 38%.”); John 
Leyden, Firms Are RUBBISH at Payment Security: One in Five Bothered to 
Meet Standards, THE REGISTER (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2011/09/29/pci_compliance_survey/. 
111 Kim Zetter, Rare Legal Fight Takes On Credit Card Company Security 
Standards and Fines, WIRED.COM (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.wired.com/ 
threatlevel/2012/01/pci-lawsuit. 
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mobile remittances is left up to the market and individual national 
regulators, then the more narrowly such technical standards focus 
on market demand, the greater their chance of widespread 
adoption.  
Developed countries are only now starting to try to incorporate 
social requirements like privacy and security into the design of ICT 
networks from the beginning. 112  Trying to incorporate social 
requirements like financial inclusion and financial integrity into 
ICT technical standards for global mobile remittances in order to 
achieve “Integrity by Design” in developing countries might be an 
even more challenging task than trying to achieve “Privacy by 
Design” in developed countries, and would be undertaken with 
even fewer resources. Because market conditions in developing 
countries may be more diverse and complex than market 
conditions in developed countries, merely developing ICT 
technical standards for interoperability may prove difficult, and 
adding AML/CFT compliance obligations to the scope of the 
standard-setting activity might doom it to failure. 
 
VI. CO-REGULATION FOR GLOBAL MARKETS 
 
In Europe, when the work of legislatures and standard-setting 
organizations is formally and explicitly coordinated, the resulting 
process is known as “co-regulation.” In the United States, similar 
processes are more likely to be referred to as “self-regulation.”113 
112 For example, the EU General Data Protection Regulation proposed in 
2012 would mandate “data protection by design and by default” in the 
processing of personal information, which has been controversial. Commission 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf. 
113 The delegation of U.S. federal securities regulation authority to “self-
regulatory organizations” such as the New York Stock Exchange or National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) is a clear example of this. JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 185-86 (3d ed. 2003) 
(1939 decision to delegate regulatory powers to NASD because of skepticism 
about government competence to regulate many aspects of the securities 
market). 
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However, because economic “self-regulation” even in LMEs takes 
place in the context of continuous dialogue between the state and 
private-sector actors, and involves at least some degree of implicit 
or explicit delegation of state authority, the term “co-regulation” 
could apply to what is referred to as “self-regulation” in the United 
States, but would often be more accurate. For this reason, the term 
“co-regulation” as used in this Article should be understood as 
including most of what is referred to as self-regulation in LMEs. 
Since the rise of the modern industrial standards movement in 
Western nations in the late nineteenth century,114 governments of 
economically developed countries have developed some kind of 
administrative “interface” between the institutions that develop 
technical standards and the formal, public legal order, including 
courts and legislatures. As in other areas of economic regulation, 
the LME countries tend to favor an ad hoc piecemeal approach to 
coordinating legislation with relevant technical standards, while 
CME countries tend to favor a formal, systematic approach.115 The 
diversity of co-regulation approaches in the United States is a 
reflection of the diversity of standard-setting organizations that are 
recognized under U.S. law.116 For example, although the official 
U.S. Standards Strategy largely consists of letting the private 
sector lead,117 some standards are issued as mandatory government 
regulations, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s standard 
for what constitutes “milk.”118 Private-sector standards normally 
114 See generally SAMUEL KRISLOV, HOW NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT 
STANDARDS AND STANDARDS CHANGE NATIONS (1997). The rise of the modern 
industrial standards movement corresponds to the “second industrial revolution” 
that began in the mid-19th century and continued through the early 20th century. 
See generally JOEL MOKYR, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1870–1914 
(1998), available at http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jmokyr/ 
castronovo.pdf. 
115 See generally Tate, supra note 64.  
116 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-TCT-512, GLOBAL 
STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 14 (1992), available at 
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9220.pdf. 
117 AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., UNITED STATES STANDARD STRATEGY 5 
(3d ed. 2010), available at http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/nss/ 
usss.aspx.  
118 7 C.F.R. § 1000.15 (2012) (“[F]luid milk product means any milk 
products containing less than 9 percent butterfat intended to be used as 
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function only as voluntary guidelines for compliance with 
government regulations, but may be converted into mandatory 
regulations by government action. 119  For example, when the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission decided to set mandatory 
minimum safety standards for children’s markers, it simply re-
issued the voluntary, consensus standard already adopted by 
industry as a mandatory regulation.120 The National Technology 
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 directs U.S. government 
agencies to use standards developed by voluntary consensus bodies 
whenever available in lieu of government-developed standards to 
accomplish its regulatory and administrative objectives. For 
example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has a program 
that permits private-sector parties to request “safe harbor” status 
for voluntary private regulations, permitting them to be cited in 
applications for pre-market approval for medical devices in lieu of 
government standards.121 
The situation in most European countries, by contrast, is much 
simpler because most national technical standards are set by a 
national standards body that works closely with government 
economic planning departments, as well as with the European 
beverages.”). 
119 See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Codes Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 
2002).  
120 A private industry association, the Arts & Creative Materials Institute, 
began developing voluntary safety standards for the children’s art market in the 
1940s; one of their standards was later taken up by the D01.57 Subcommittee of 
the D01 Technical Committee of the American Society for Testing and 
Materials (an ANSI accredited SDO) and issued as ASTM D-4236 in 1983, 
before being adopted by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission under 
the 1988 Labeling of Hazardous Art Materials Act as a mandatory safety 
regulation for markers in the U.S. market and codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1500.14(b) 
(2012). 
121 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration maintains a database of all 
voluntary, consensus standards that it has designated as equivalent to 
government standards; private parties are free to reference them in market 
approval applications but are not required to do so. Guidance for Industry and 
FDA Staff – Recognition and Use of Consensus Standards, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ 
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm077274.htm.  
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standards organizations: CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. 122  At the 
European Union level, a very successful co-regulatory framework 
known as the “New Approach” to standardization was developed 
in the 1980s to promote the Internal Market by reducing technical 
barriers to trade among member states.123 The New Approach was 
devised to end the gridlock that had characterized efforts to 
harmonize technical standards in the Internal Market in the 
1970s.124 That old approach favored mandatory harmonization to a 
single standard, maximizing the problems of transition from many 
existing national standards to a single new European standard, thus 
fueling opposition from almost all stakeholders every step of the 
way. The New Approach required one of the European standards 
bodies to develop a standard that created a voluntary “safe harbor” 
for products that were certified compliant with it, permitting any 
producer who wanted to continue using national standards without 
the presumption of compliance to do so. The scope of the reference 
standard also only covered “essential requirements.” Each New 
Approach standard was developed to support a Directive, and the 
link between the technical standard and the legislation was 
established by publishing notices in the Official Journal rather than 
re-issuing the technical standard itself as legislation. The result was 
a loose coupling of traditional legislative processes with voluntary, 
consensus technical standard-setting processes that made it easier 
to accommodate technological innovation and also reduced 
statutory obsolescence caused by mandatory regulations based on 
standards that had become outdated. 
The economies in countries where mobile money as a financial 
inclusion strategy is likely to have the most impact in terms of 
economic development are predominantly rural and agricultural so 
links between the state and modern technical standard-setting 
122 See generally European Standards Organizations (ESOs), CENELEC, 
http://www.cenelec.eu/aboutcenelec/whoweare/europeanpartners/index.html 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
123 Council Directive 83/189/EEC, Laying Down a Procedure for the 
Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations, 
1983 O.J. (L 109) 8 (EC), amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 217) 18 (EC). 
124 MICHELLE EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS, 
REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE (2002).  
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institutions will normally be weak or simply non-existent. Some 
developing countries have developed an interface between 
government and technical standard-developing institutions, 
however, and in those countries, there is some evidence that the 
familiar LME versus CME distinction can be observed. In the case 
of M-Pesa, Kenya (a developing LME) pursued a more flexible, ad 
hoc market-oriented approach. 125  By contrast, in India (a 
developing CME) the central government has set a national open 
standards strategy in addition to financial inclusion and financial 
integrity strategies, and is working on a national mobile payment 
interoperability standard as part of its strategy of modernizing its 
payment systems generally. 
More recently, another “co-regulatory” framework emerged in 
the European Union within which technical standards and 
legislation are even more loosely coupled. 126 The “Single Euro 
Payment Area” (SEPA) is the name applied to a public-private 
initiative in Europe to make the market for cross-border Euro 
transfers more efficient. When the Euro was launched in 1999, the 
bank clearing and settlement systems of different Eurozone 
member states were not interoperable because each country relied 
on separate legacy computer systems. Before the launch of the 
Euro, the banks had used the lack of technical interoperability as a 
justification to charge high fees for cross-border electronic funds 
transfers (EFTs). After the launch of the Euro, the Commission 
tried unsuccessfully to persuade the banks to lower their cross-
border fees for Euro transfers. The banks resisted because merely 
adopting a new currency would not suddenly make their computer 
systems interoperable, so their actual costs for processing cross-
border Euro transfers remained high. The Commission responded 
by issuing Regulation 2560/2001 prohibiting banks in the 
Eurozone from charging higher fees for cross-border Euro EFTs 
than for domestic Euro EFTs.127 As a result, because domestic EFT 
125 Buku & Meredith, supra note 6.  
126 Agnieszka Janczuk, Legislative Development: The Single Payments Area 
in Europe, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 321, 335 (2010) (“[O]ne could characterize it as 
a scheme of co-regulation . . . .”). 
127 Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 2560/2001, Cross-Border 
Payments in Euro, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 13, subsequently updated as Parliament 
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fees were generally very low, or in some countries had even been 
set at zero to encourage customers to stop paying by check, banks 
in the Eurozone began losing money on all cross-border Euro 
transfers.  
In 2002, the major Eurozone banks responded by forming the 
European Payment Council, an industry trade association and 
standard-setting organization. Its membership structure is similar 
to that of an ICT consortium: membership is voluntary, but 
restricted to banks and European banking industry associations.128 
The EPC’s mission is to promote and support SEPA,129 and so it 
maintains a close dialogue not only with its member banks, but 
also with EU regulators. To solve the cross-border interoperability 
problem, the EPC develops “schemes” that combine technical 
engineering specifications with harmonized business processes.130 
The SEPA Credit Transfer and Direct Debit schemes include ICT 
interoperability standards within the ISO 20022 framework as well 
as business process rules. In addition, EU banks are required to 
provide their customers with bank account numbers in the 
“International Bank Account Number” format for use with cross-
border Euro transfers.131 
The EPC originally set up informal “councils” to solicit input 
from non-bank stakeholder groups such as end users, but they 
produced mixed results. While the SEPA Credit Transfer scheme 
and Council Regulation (EC) 924/2009, Cross-Border Payments in the 
Community, at recital 5, 2009 O.J. (L 266) 11. 
128 Charter of the European Payments Council, EUR. PAYMENTS COUNCIL, § 
7.1 (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/knowledge 
_bank_detail.cfm?documents_id=337. 
129 Id. at § 2.  
130 What Is a Payment Scheme. EUR. PAYMENTS COUNCIL, 
http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/content.cfm?page=what_is_a_payment
_scheme_sepa_customers (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
131 Article 37 of the PSD states that European bank customers must be 
provided with unique identifiers for beneficiaries of cross-border Euro transfers. 
Parliament and Council Directive 2007/64/EC, Payment Services in the Internal 
Market, 2007 O.J. (L 319). The “unique identifier” used in SEPA is the IBAN, 
which is based on ISO 13616-1:2007 Financial services - International bank 
account number (IBAN). Payments Market Practice Grp., White Paper on Use 
of IBAN in International Payments, SWIFT (June 2011), http://www.swift.com/ 
resources/documents/PMPG_IBAN_Whitepaper_July_2011.pdf. 
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proved to be relatively uncontroversial, harmonizing business 
practices for direct debits from customer accounts proved to be 
very controversial.132 Users who felt excluded from EPC processes 
for drafting schemes and dissatisfied with the design of the SEPA 
direct debit scheme complained to the Commission that the EPC 
was not open and transparent. In 2009, the Commission 
summarized the governance challenges facing the EPC in the 
following terms:  
The EPC has made progress in balancing the 
interests of different stakeholders, but it must 
operate in a more open manner to avoid possible 
foreclosure effects and take into account the 
interests of all stakeholders, including non-banking 
stakeholders, payment institutions and users. 
Greater transparency, adequate time for consultation 
and early involvement of all stakeholders, in 
particular users, in the planning and design of future 
initiatives need to be ensured.133  
The SEPA Council was launched in 2010 with the mandate of 
promoting the implementation of the SEPA system and also 
ensuring accountability and transparency in SEPA governance 
process. It meets twice a year, and is co-chaired by representatives 
of the European Commission and European Central Bank. The 
SEPA Council members include five representatives from the user 
side of the market (consumers, retailers, businesses, and national 
authorities); five representatives from the supplier side (European 
Payments Council, cooperative banks, savings banks, commercial 
banks, and payment institutions); and four national central bank 
board members (representing the Eurosystem).134 The EPC now 
engages in extensive consultation with external stakeholder groups 
132 EU Direct Debit Rules Open to Fraud, Says Consumer Group, 
EURACTIVE.COM (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.euractiv.com/payments/eu-direct-
debit-rules-open-fraud-news-223371. 
133 Commission Communication, Completing SEPA: A Roadmap for 2009-
2012, COM(2009) 471 final (Sept. 10, 2009) (emphasis added). 
134 SEPA Council, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
payments/sepa/council_en.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
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before finalizing or amending schemes.135 
At the same time that the Commission and external 
stakeholders were growing frustrated with the EPC’s governance 
system, the EPC was growing frustrated with the Commission’s 
reluctance to support the work of the EPC with the full weight of 
EU legislation. The original vision for SEPA was that use of 
legacy national EFT systems would end and that all Euro transfers, 
domestic or cross-border, would be based on EPC standards; but 
without any statutory mandate, domestic Euro transfers were not 
being converted to the new formats. For example, the SEPA Credit 
Transfer Scheme was launched in 2007 with great fanfare, but by 
2011, only 22.6 percent of all Euro transfers were made using it.136 
Recognizing that progress in building SEPA had stalled, the EU 
Council and Parliament declared the need for a legislated “SEPA 
end date” to accelerate the migration process.137 The Commission 
responded, however, with a proposal to open up to competition the 
process of setting SEPA standards, without a firm commitment to 
an end date.138 Although the Commission tried to characterize the 
135 See, e.g., Javier Santamaría, EPC Plenary Meeting Update, EPC NEWSL. 
(Eur. Payments Council), July 2012, at 47, available at 
http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/pdf/EPC_Newsletter_300712_15.pdf 
(At the EPC Member Plenary Meeting in June 2012, “It was decided that prior 
to continuing work to finalise the new optional SDD Fixed Amount Scheme, the 
following bodies would be consulted: the Payment Systems End User 
Committee (EUC) – in particular the BEUC (Bureau Européen des Unions de 
Consommateurs), the European Consumer's Organisation – and the SEPA 
Council chaired by the European Commission (the Commission) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) to ensure that the work is supported by the end 
users as well as the ECB and the Commission.”). 
136 Etienne Goosse, SEPA Migration: Facts and Figures, EPC NEWSL. (Eur. 
Payments Council), Jan. 2012, at 27, available at 
http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/pdf/EPC_Newsletter_300112_13.pdf. 
137 Council Conclusions on SEPA, COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION (Dec. 2, 
2009), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ 
ecofin/111670.pdf; Parliament Resolution 2010/C 349 E/09 of 10 March 2010 
on the Implementation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), 2010 O.J. (C 
349). 
138 Internal Market and Services DG, Working Paper on SEPA Migration 
End-Date EUR. COMM’N (June 2, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
payments/docs/sepa/end-date_migration_en.pdf. (If Commission remains 
“neutral” with regard to specific standards, and only mandates “essential 
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development of EPC standards as a “market-driven” process that 
should be subject to competition, EPC members understood that 
SEPA schemes were public goods constructed by private 
enterprises at their own expense in furtherance of the 
Commission’s goal of building the Internal Market: 
SEPA was not started as a demand-driven process, 
but as a policy-maker-driven EU integration 
initiative. The political SEPA vision aims to 
generate macro-economic benefits, strengthen the 
euro currency, drive forward the integration of the 
internal market and accelerate technological 
innovation in payments and beyond. In other words, 
SEPA is supposed to promote the public interest of 
European citizens at large. The current [low] rate of 
SEPA market uptake therefore, is perfectly in line 
with the progress of any other major EU integration 
initiative promoting a good that is not assumed to 
produce immediate benefits, requires initial 
investment to be realised and lacks clear regulatory 
direction. The European Commission itself 
recognises that full migration to SEPA would take 
some thirty years if projected based on market 
uptake to date. Consequently, the majority of 
stakeholders recognise that deadlines for SEPA 
migration must be set through EU legislation.139 
The low voluntary adoption rates for SEPA schemes clearly 
demonstrated that the SEPA project was not market-driven, and 
without decisive intervention by a regulator, it would simply fail to 
achieve its original goals. In 2012, the Commission issued the 
SEPA End-Date Regulation, setting February 1, 2014 as the 
deadline for phasing out the use of old national Euro transfer 
requirements” for SEPA migration, then it might be possible for a new SEPA 
standard setting process to be organized to compete with EPC). 
139 Gerard Hartsink, So What’s in a Name? Explaining Payment Schemes, 
Instruments and Systems, EPC NEWSL (Eur. Payments Council), Oct. 2010, at 1, 
available at http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/pdf/EPC_Newsletter_ 
251010_8.pdf .  
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schemes and full migration to the new EPC SEPA Credit Transfer 
and Direct Debit Schemes.140 
Between market pressure for reform created by the original 
Regulation 2560/2001 and a statutory end-date established in 2012, 
together with the creation of the SEPA Council, the EPC and the 
Commission ended up in something close to the “New Approach” 
co-regulatory framework. The process looked more like LME 
informality than CME organization, however. With regard to the 
possibility of combining harmonized AML/CFT compliance 
business processes with ICT technical interoperability standards 
into something like “schemes” for a global mobile remittance 
network, the SEPA experience suggests that some degree of 
coercion by a central regulator would be necessary, and that the 
process of building and fine-tuning the “interface” between 
political institutions, markets and SDOs would be complex.  
A global mobile remittance network will require some kind of 
co-regulatory interface, and the competition has already begun 
among developed and developing countries with both LME and 
CME orientations to take a leadership role in building that 
interface. Developed and developing countries that already have 
standards strategies in place are most likely to emerge as leaders in 
that process, while developing countries without national standards 
strategies will be unable to contribute much without a great deal of 
technical assistance. From the perspective of legitimacy, however, 
regulators and consumers in less developed countries may be 
essential stakeholders even though they currently lack the capacity 
to participate actively or directly in the creation of governance 
institutions. The inability of billions of global mobile remittance 
network stakeholders in developing countries to participate in the 
early stages of standard setting should give rise to concern about 
possible “foreclosure effects.” 
What would a co-regulatory framework that promotes dialogue 
between FATF and private ICT SDOs, and minimizes the risk of 
foreclosure effects for the least developed countries look like? It 
might include some of the following elements: 
140 Parliament and Council Regulation 260/2012, Establishing Technical and 
Business Requirements for Credit Transfers and Direct Debits in Euro and 
Amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009, 2012 O.J. (L 94/22).  
 
                                                                                                             
242 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:3 
 
 Representatives of each standard-setting organization might 
be sent to observe each other’s meetings. 
 Technical assistance might be provided to representatives 
of less developed countries to permit them to participate as 
observers in private ICT SDO activities relevant to global 
mobile remittance standards. 
 A procedure might be established to determine whether 
private standard-setting organizations developing global 
mobile remittance standards relevant to AML/CTF 
compliance processes meet the due process requirements 
set out in the Code of Good Practice in Annex 3 to the 
WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. 
 Recognition of effective use of ICT standards to enhance 
compliance might be highlighted in FATF Mutual 
Evaluation Reports, building up a kind of precedent 
system.141 
 The FATF might issue guidance establishing a presumption 
of compliance with regard to specific issues when 
compliance with certain “schemes” (incorporating both 
business practice and ICT standards) has been certified by 
an accredited independent third party. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mobile money offers much greater promise than almost any 
other development strategy to emerge since the modern study of 
development began after World War II.142 An operational global 
mobile remittance network would have an impact on the payment 
systems in any country that is either a source of poor economic 
141 The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has created an informal system of 
precedent in the area of information security law through settlement agreements 
with companies it claims have engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices as 
a result of bad security practices. JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW 
OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE §§ 14.03[O][1], 17.06[E] (2001 & Supp. 2012). 
142 On the post-World War II origins of the modern study of development, 
see generally GERALD M. MEIER & DUDLEY SEERS, PIONEERS IN DEVELOPMENT 
(1984). 
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migrants or a target destination for them. No such network exists 
today, but, spearheaded by Visa and the GSM Association, a 
technical standards architecture for one is already emerging. The 
development of such a global architecture could promote financial 
inclusion without regard to national boundaries. The challenges 
facing EU regulators in creating a “Single Euro Payment Area” 
illustrate clearly the problems that might arise if developing 
countries each build their own mobile money systems and, only 
after they are complete, attempt to make them interoperable.  
A global mobile remittance architecture might also provide an 
opportunity to integrate financial integrity functions into the 
operation of the network. If developing country regulatory 
requirements could be addressed in the same ICT standards that 
constitute the network, then the real cost to developing countries of 
AML/CFT compliance might fall with the growth of global mobile 
money networks. In such a case, expansion of the network would 
simultaneously enhance both financial inclusion and financial 
integrity goals. The challenges facing the card networks trying to 
increase security at the retail point-of-sale with the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard illustrate clearly the risks of trying 
to “bolt on” compliance functions rather than “baking them in” 
from the beginning. 
In recent decades, regulatory competition in many global ICT 
markets has been intense as countries try to push the development 
of technical standards in a direction that is compatible with their 
existing institutions. So it should not be surprising if regulatory 
competition emerges to set standards for a global mobile 
remittance market. The standard-setting activities that are already 
underway are within the “liberal market economy” tradition, and 
without external pressure from national regulators or international 
regulators with market clout, are unlikely to internalize any costs 
of AML/CTF compliance. They are also more likely to be 
dominated by private parties and to rely on proprietary 
technologies. By contrast, “coordinated market economy” 
regulators are more likely to embrace open standards. They are 
also more likely adopt policies like “privacy by design” that 
require private parties to internalize significant social regulation 
costs in the development of products and standards. If developed 
and developing CME countries supported an “integrity by design” 
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approach in standard setting, then AML/CTF compliance costs in 
developing countries pursing mobile money financial inclusion 
strategies might fall. 
A common reason that technical standard-setting efforts fail, 
however, is that the problems the standard-setting process tried to 
address were “over-constrained” or became too political.143 Within 
the LME approach to ICT standard setting, it is often possible to 
keep a tight focus on meeting market demand as quickly and 
effectively as possible. Because financial integrity is a regulatory 
obligation imposed on financial service providers, it is unlikely 
that financial integrity functions would be incorporated into LME 
market-driven standards in the absence of a clear regulatory 
mandate. The FATF, as the focal institution for global AML/CTF 
regulations, does not yet appear to have focused on ICT standards 
as a mechanism for reducing compliance burdens, let alone to have 
considered issuing such a mandate. Should it choose to focus on 
ICT schemes that combine technical interoperability standards and 
harmonized business process standards as a policy mechanism, 
then ICT governance issues would immediately surface. At that 
point, careful analysis of some of the co-regulatory mechanisms 
already in use in the United States and European Union might help 
frame governance issues related to regulatory effectiveness and 
legitimacy for global mobile money networks. 
143 The IETF addresses both problems simultaneously with its “rough 
consensus and running code” standard. If rough consensus is not possible, i.e., 
the problem is too political, it is not undertaken. If there is not more than one 
successful implementation of the standard, i.e., running code, then the standard 
is not issued. More political organizations such as ISO and the ITU do not have 
the luxury of simply refusing to work on projects or failing to complete them. 
As a result, their portfolios are replete with standards with no known adoptions. 
 
                                                                                                             
